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Philosophical and sociological approaches in technology have 
increasingly shifted toward describing AI (artificial intelligence) 
systems as ‘(moral) agents,’ while also attributing ‘agency’ to them. It 
is only in this way – so their principal argument goes – that the effects 
of technological components in a complex human-computer interaction 
can be understood sufficiently in phenomenological-descriptive and 
ethical-normative respects. By contrast, this article aims to demonstrate 
that an explanatory model only achieves a descriptively and 
normatively satisfactory result if the concepts of ‘(moral) agent’ and 
‘(moral) agency’ are exclusively related to human agents. Initially, the 
division between symbolic and sub-symbolic AI, the black box character 
of (deep) machine learning, and the complex relationship network in the 
provision and application of machine learning are outlined. Next, the 
ontological and action-theoretical basic assumptions of an ‘agency’ 
attribution regarding both the current teleology-naturalism debate and 
the explanatory model of actor network theory are examined. On this 
basis, the technical-philosophical approaches of Luciano Floridi, 
Deborah G. Johnson, and Peter-Paul Verbeek will all be critically 
discussed. Despite their different approaches, they tend to fully 
integrate computational behavior into their concept of ‘(moral) agency.’ 
By contrast, this essay recommends distinguishing conceptually 
between the different entities, causalities, and relationships in a human-
computer interaction, arguing that this is the only way to do justice to 




Introduction: Exemplary harmful outcomes 
 
Artifacts have played a substantial role in human activity since the first Paleolithic hand 
axes came into use. However, the emergence of an (ethical) discussion about which roles 
can be attributed to the people and artifacts involved in an action is only a consequence 
of the increasing penetration of artifacts carrying ‘artificial intelligence’ (AI) into our 
everyday lives. 
Let us consider three examples of the potentially harmful effect of sophisticated 
machine learning approaches: 







1) Google’s search engine shows ads for high-paying executive jobs to men, but not 
so much to women.1 Google’s photo tagging service incorrectly labeled photos 
showing African-American people as showing ‘gorillas.’2 Even years after being 
alerted to this racist behavior, Google did not fix the machine learning approach 
itself, instead simply removing the word ‘gorilla’ from the set of possible labels.3 
2) Amazon developed a machine learning system designed to analyze the résumés 
of job applicants and rate them with respect to their technical skills. The system 
was shown to be sexist in how it distinguished between applicants: ‘It penalized 
résumés that included the word ‘women’s,’ as in ‘women’s chess club captain.’ 
And it downgraded graduates of two all-women’s colleges.’4 Amazon eventually 
shut down the system after failing to fully prevent discrimination. 
3) In pretrial, parole, and sentencing decisions in the U.S., machine learning 
algorithms frequently predict a criminal defendant’s likelihood of committing a 
future crime. The calculation of these so-called ‘recidivism scores’ is made by 
commercial providers that do not disclose the workings of their models. It was 
demonstrated for a widely used criminal risk assessment tool that used 137 
features concerning an individual that the model performs no better than a 
simple logistic regression using just two features: age and the defendant's total 
number of previous convictions.5 Yet, the seemingly more sophisticated 137-
feature black box is being used in practice and has been accused of having a 
racial bias.6,7 
 
We do not suggest that Google, Amazon, or the providers of criminal risk assessment 
tools are sexist, racist, or discriminatory by purpose in any other way. These examples 
merely illustrate that even well-intentioned initiatives using subsymbolic AI black boxes 
can lead to harmful outcomes. These systems may do very well with respect to some 
performance measures but may have inductive biases which are hard to detect and hard 
to fix. Overall, applications of AI, and especially subsymbolic machine learning-based 
 
 
1 Cf. Julia Carpenter, ‘Google’s Algorithm Shows Prestigious Job Ads to Men, But Not to Women. 




2 Cf. Alex Hern, ‘Google’s Solution to Accidental Algorithmic Racism: Ban Gorillas’, The Guardian 
(January 12, 2018), online at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/12/google-
racism-ban-gorilla-black-people (accessed 2019-11-10). 
3 Cf. ibid. 
4 Reuters, ‘Amazon Ditched AI Recruiting Tool that Favored Men for Technical Jobs’, The Guardian 
(October 11, 2018), online at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/10/amazon-
hiring-ai-gender-bias-recruiting-engine (accessed 2019-11-10). 
5 Cf. Julia Dressel and Hany Farid, ‘The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism’, 
Science Advances 4:1 (2018). 
6 Cf. Anthony W. Flores, Kristin Bechtel and Christopher T. Lowenkamp, ‘False Positives, False 
Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to ‘Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the 
Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks’‘, Federal Probation Journal 80:2 
(2016), pp. 38-46. 
7 Cf. Sam Corbett-Davies et al., ‘A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions was 
Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear’, The Washington Post (October 17, 
2016), online at www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-
algorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas (accessed 2019-11-10). 







systems, are part of complex socio-technical systems. There is no doubt that AI systems 
have moral impact, but do they act and reason morally?8  
The question of whether it is possible to create ethically acting machines 
represents an ongoing discussion.9,10 Additionally, the dominant approaches of technical 
philosophy and sociology currently emphasize the moral significance of AI systems, and 
have moved towards calling them ‘(moral) agents’ and attributing them ‘agency.’ The 
principal argument of this approach is that it allows us to describe both the moral effect 
of an action’s technological components and the complex network of human-computer 
interaction in a sufficiently descriptive and ethical manner. It is therefore crucial to 
elucidate the semantics of ‘agency’ and ‘moral agency,’ as well as their connection to the 
concept of responsibility, in order to provide more clarity in settings involving hybrid 
human-computer intelligence. The central issue is whether we can better grasp the 
descriptive and normative dimensions of AI and especially subsymbolic machine-
learning-based systems with the help of the ‘agency’ attribution. 
In the first part of this research, we provide basic information on symbolic and 
subsymbolic AI, the black box character of (deep) machine learning, and the complex 
relationship networks in the supply and application of machine learning.  
The second part elaborates ontological and action-theoretical basic assumptions 
of agency attribution regarding the current teleology-naturalism debate, as well as an 
explanatory model of Actor-Network Theory (ANT).  
Thirdly, three technical philosophical models describing computer systems as 
‘(moral) agents’ are critically analyzed with regard to whether an extended agency 
attribution really illuminates the descriptive and ethical-normative structure of human-
computer interaction, or whether it obscures this. 
 
 
Background on artificial intelligence 
 
AI describes a computer ‘system’s ability to correctly interpret external data, to learn 
from such data, and to use those learnings to achieve specific goals and tasks through 
flexible adaptation.’11 Different levels of AI include narrow AI (below human-level 
intelligence, outperforming humans in specific domains but not being potent in other 
domains), general AI (human-level intelligence across many domains), and artificial 
super intelligence (above human-level intelligence). Contemporary AI systems show 
narrow AI (also known as weak AI).  
Early computer programs solved tasks that can logically be described with a set 
of rules and are therefore easy for computers but require prolonged effort for people. A 
branch of AI still follows this route: computers are equipped with a formal representation 
of knowledge about the world and the rules of logical reasoning. Thus, they deductively 
generate new insights. This type of AI is symbolic AI because it builds on explicit symbolic 
 
 
8 Cf. ibid. 
9 Cf. Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson, ’Machine Ethics. Creating an Ethical Intelligent 
Agent’, AI Magazine 28:4 (2007), pp. 15-26. 
10 Cf. Gordana Dodig Crnkovic and Baran Çürüklü, ‘Robots: Ethical by Design’, Ethics and 
Information Technology 14:1 (2012), pp. 61-71. 
11 Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, ‘Siri, Siri, in My Hand: Who’s the Fairest in the Land? On 
the Interpretations, Illustrations, and Implications of Artificial Intelligence’, Business Horizons 62:1 
(2019), pp. 15-25. 







programming and inference algorithms. IBM's chess computer Deep Blue defeating the 
chess world champion Gary Kasparov in 1997 is an example of a symbolic (narrow) AI 
system. The other type of AI is subsymbolic AI using machine learning. The challenge for 
today’s computer programs is to solve tasks that for humans are hard to describe 
formally, as they are more intuitive; for example, speech recognition, face recognition, or 
emotions.12 Machine learning aims to build computers that automatically improve 
through experience.13 A computer program learns from experience with respect to a class 
of tasks and a specific performance measure, if its performance on tasks of that class 
improves with experience.14 However, this focus on experience might lead to an 
inductive bias if training data is not representative of the data and situations a machine 
learning model will face after training. Within AI, ‘machine learning has emerged as the 
method of choice for developing practical software for computer vision, speech 
recognition, natural language processing, robot control, and other applications.’15 
Contemporary voice assistants, such as Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, and Microsoft’s 
Cortana, leverage such subsymbolic (narrow) AI.  
Symbolic AI is easier to debug, easier to explain, and easier to control than 
subsymbolic AI, as symbolic programming lends itself to human inspection. Subsymbolic 
AI requires less upfront knowledge, builds on learning from data more successfully and 
shows better performance than symbolic AI in many domains, especially on perceptual 
tasks.  
Deep learning is a form of machine learning that has gained popularity in recent 
years due to advances in (big) data availability, (cloud-based) massive computing power, 
algorithms, and openly available libraries for using these algorithms. In this context, the 
'depth' refers to the number of layers in the network’s structure; for example, in an 
artificial neural network (ANN). In the training phase, the strength of the connections (an 
analogy to brain synapses) between different nodes (an analogy to brain neurons) in the 
network is identified and learned. The more nodes and connections a network has, the 
better the network can acquire structural descriptions of the domain (if sufficient training 
data is available). Some of the largest artificial neural networks have millions of nodes 
and billions of connections.  
 
Black box character of (deep) machine learning 
Machine learning models, especially deep ANN, are frequently perceived as a black 
box.16 Once such a model is then trained, and calculating the output based on a given 
input is rather simple. In principle, all the weights and functions to apply can be 
inspected manually. However, the sheer number of nodes and connections in a deep 
ANN, as well as the non-linearity of the calculations, make it practically very difficult, if 
not impossible, to fully understand the model’s behavior for all but the most trivial 
examples. It is even more difficult to ex-ante predict the outcome of the statistical 
learning process. Thus, many people effectively perceive deep learning as a black box.  
 
 
12 Cf. ibid., p. 15. 
13 Cf. Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence. A Modern Approach (Boston: Pearson, 
2016). 
14 Cf. Tom M. Mitchell, Machine Learning (Boston, Mass.: WBC/McGraw-Hill, 1997). 
15 Russell and Norvig, Artificial Intelligence, p. 255. 
16 Cf. Davide Castelvecchi, ‘Can we open the black box of AI?’, Nature 538:7623 (2016), pp. 20-23. 







Over recent years, applications of AI became more sophisticated in terms of high-
impact and high-risk tasks, such as autonomous driving or medical diagnosis. This has 
led to an increasing need for explanations.17 At the same time, this rising complexity has 
made it more difficult to get insights and to understand and trust the system's functions – 
not just for users, but also for the programmers of those algorithms.18 A logical model, 
like a decision-tree with statements involving ‘and,’ ‘if-then,’ etc., is comprehensible for 
the user. The larger the decision tree, the longer it takes, but humans are able to work 
through this process. Understanding deep learning models with millions or even billions 
of connections can be compared to understanding human predictions: we might 
anticipate what the system predicts, based on prior experience with the system, but we 
will never be completely sure if our assumption about the system’s operating principles 
is correct.   
This lack of transparency stands at the core of the discussion about the 
accountability and responsibility of humans regarding AI systems: can the user trust a 
prediction or be responsible for a decision made by a system that she or he cannot 
understand? To solve this issue, the research stream of explainable AI discusses two main 
options: white box and black box approaches. White box approaches aim at transparency, 
for instance, by displaying verbally or graphically the ‘information contained in the 
knowledge base,’ or via explaining the evidence, such as displaying the symptoms and 
test results that indicate the existence of a disease.19 As the operating principles of linear 
models or decision trees are easier to understand, those models still dominate in many 
application areas.20 Nevertheless, complex machine-learning models are in the fast lane 
and should offer explanations of their predictions to users. Due to the rising complexity 
of such systems, we cannot expect users to understand how the models work.21  
Taking the example of an ANN, black box approaches focus on, for example, 
visualizing the input-output relationship, thus showing which input is most responsible 
for reaching a certain output.22,23 These approaches help users and programmers shed 
light on the black box, but they do not reveal the whole complex functions of the ANN. 
Therefore, such approaches make AI ‘more of a grey than a black box.’24 Still, these highly 
performant black and grey box machine learning systems pose challenges in terms of 






17 Cf. Jichen Zhu et al., ‘Explainable AI for Designers: A Human-Centered Perspective on Mixed-
Initiative Co-Creation’, IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (2018), pp. 1-8. 
18 Cf. Mitchell, Machine Learning.  
19 Cf. Carmen Lacave and Francisco J. Díez, ‘A Review of Explanation Methods for Bayesian 
Networks’, The Knowledge Engineering Review 17:2 (2002), pp. 107-127. 
20 Cf. Grégoire Montavon, Wojciech Samek and Klaus-Robert Müller, ‘Methods for Interpreting and 
Understanding Deep Neural Networks’, Digital Signal Processing 73 (2018), pp. 1-15. 
21 Cf. Or Biran and Kathleen McKeown, ‘Human-Centric Justification of Machine Learning 
Predictions’, Proceedings of International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence (2017), pp. 1461-
1467. 
22 Cf. Zhu et al., ‘Explainable AI for Designers’. 
23 Cf. Ruth C. Fong and Andrea Vedaldi, ‘Interpretable Explanations of Black Boxes by Meaningful 
Perturbation’, Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision (2017), pp. 3429-
3437. 
24 Zhu et al., ‘Explainable AI for Designers’. 







Complex relationship networks in the supply and application of machine learning  
Figure 1 is a stylized picture of the value chain from algorithm development, all the way 
through to the human being affected by a decision. It is an abstract depiction of the 
processes behind the examples given above. By showing the different types of human 
actors involved, it can thereby illustrate the complex interplay between different human 
actors and artifacts.  
 
Figure 1: Stylized value chain from algorithm development to use of machine learning systems 
 
Algorithm development conceives general-purpose machine learning algorithms. System 
development embeds these algorithms in a software system, typically for a specific 
purpose like criminal risk assessment or personnel decisions. The system is trained on the 
basis of data that originates from it (e.g., prior decisions by humans like evaluating 
résumés or sentencing criminals). Organizations like a court system or a company – or, 
more specifically, managers within an organization – then decide to use the system. 
Finally, individual users (like a clerk in the personnel department or a judge) interact 
with the machine learning-based system to obtain information and make decisions that 
affect others, like applicants or defendants.  
If this overall socio-technical system harms people, who is responsible? There are 
eight candidates: (1) the technical AI system, despite it being an artifact; (2) the users 
obliged to use a system they do not understand; (3) the managers who neither 
understand the black box nor make individual decisions; (4) the organization; (5) the data 
scientists, despite the fact they do not make decisions concerning individual persons; (6) 
the people providing the training data, oftentimes unknowingly; (7) the software 
engineers, despite their inability to foresee the system’s behavior after learning; and (8) 
the algorithm developers who created the multi-purpose black boxes in the first place. Is 
any single candidate responsible, several of them (each to a certain degree), is the overall 




Pre-assumptions of agency attribution based on action theory 
 
Asking what an actor or an action is and how it can be explained leads to a branched 
discussion of very different approaches to action theory. This makes it clear that agency 
attribution depends on several ontological and action-theoretical basic assumptions. 
Whoever uses concepts of action must not shy away from reflecting on these 
fundamental implications. Only against this background can different positions and their 
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The teleology-naturalism debate concerns whether we can adequately describe 
and understand human actions and natural events by the same language and at the same 
level. Actor-Network Theory seeks to overcome the distinction between humans and 
non-humans by describing an actor as the symmetrical interplay between social, 
technical, and natural entities. 
 
The teleology-naturalism debate in action theory 
In order to determine the ways in which an action differs from a natural event, it is 
instructive to take a closer look at how we talk about it. We usually explain actions 
through the intentions of the person doing them (‘She opened the window to air the 
room’), thus attributing the mental capacity to have goals, make decisions, etc. In 
contrast, we consider a natural event as the (provisional) end of a causal chain, and name 
the previous chain links as an explanation for its taking place (‘The window opened 
because a gust of wind blew against it’).25 Obviously, we distinguish between a ‘mental’ 
language, which refers to actions, and a ‘physical’26 language, which refers to natural 
events.27 As long as both are applied only in their respective fields, there is no problem. 
However, it is questionable whether the same event can be expressed in both languages: 
is the window opening perhaps also due to certain neuronal states that triggered the 
woman's arm movement? Is such a physical description perhaps even more accurate than 
referring to mental states and abilities? 
How do these different descriptions of the same event relate to each other? Are 
both of them legitimate perspectives that are able to coexist, or do they exclude each 
other so that at least one of them must be wrong? As a third option, one language might 
be translatable into the other.28  
This is exactly the basic assumption of the naturalistic approach: anything 
expressed in mental language can be translated into physical language without any loss 
of meaning. Ultimately, there is no ontological difference between actions and natural 
events.29 Accordingly, actions are subject to the same causal laws as natural events. 
Therefore, they can, in theory, be retrospectively deduced from a certain set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions, as well as predicted for the future if those very conditions are 
fulfilled (deductive-nomological explanatory scheme) – even if an accurate prediction is 
practically difficult to realize due to the complex interplay of numerous internal and 
external conditional factors.30 In order to avoid this problem, a simpler action pattern is 
declared the object of investigation: the so-called ‘basic action,’ which consists of only a 
 
 
25 Cf. Edmund Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen? Eine philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit dem 
Naturalismus. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1996, p. 17, 106; Christoph Horn and Guido Löhrer, 
‘Einleitung: Die Wiederentdeckung teleologischer Handlungserklärungen’, in Gründe und Zwecke. 
Texte zur aktuellen Handlungstheorie, edited by Christoph Horn and Guido Löhrer (Berlin: 
Suhrkamp, 2010), pp. 7-45, at p. 8. 
26 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, p. 18. 
27 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, p. 106. 
28 Cf. Scott R. Sehon, ‘Abweichende Kausalketten und die Irreduzibilität telologischer Erklärungen’, 
in Gründe und Zwecke. Texte zur aktuellen Handlungstheorie, edited by  Christoph Horn and Guido 
Löhrer (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010), pp. 85-111, at p. 87; Horn, ‘Einleitung’, pp. 15f. 
29 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, pp. 15, 24-26. 
30 Cf. ibid., pp. 26, 106f, 110; Josef Quitterer, ‘Basishandlungen und die Naturalisierung von 
Handlungserklärungen’, in Soziologische Handlungstheorie. Einheit oder Vielfalt, edited by Andreas 
Balog and Manfred Gabriel (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), pp. 105-122, at pp. 106f.  







simple body movement (e.g. bending a finger).31 If one regards the different levels of an 
action as an ‘action tree,’ then this ‘basic action’ represents the lowest, most basal level, 
which cannot be further explained by other partial actions. You get to higher levels by 
asking ‘why?’: he bent his finger to pull the trigger of a weapon, to fire a bullet at a 
person, to kill that person, etc. By contrast, you reach a lower level by asking ‘how?’: he 
killed him by shooting at him, by using the trigger, by bending the finger, etc. At this 
point, where you cannot break down the question of ‘how?’ any further, you have 
reached the lowest level.32 Regardless of whether you consider these levels to describe the 
same action or many different actions,33 both positions agree that the ‘basic action’ is the 
main, essential action on which further analysis has to concentrate. 
The teleological approach contrasts with the naturalistic approach, and its 
followers criticize the orientation towards ‘basic actions’: in order to do justice to the 
nature of an action, it cannot be reduced to a body movement. On the contrary, the 
higher levels of the action tree are to be examined, where the actor‘s intentions, systems 
of rules and signs, the situational context with possibly involved third parties, etc. are 
situated.34 Certain actions (e.g. greeting, betting, lecturing) are not dependent on a certain 
movement of the body, and therefore cannot be reduced to it.35 But even actions whose 
correlation to body movements is evident, such as firing a weapon, are principally 
comprehensible only against the background of their circumstances and references: not 
the bending of the finger, but the intention to kill, the connection with the victim, etc., 
which constitute the action.36 The reference to lower levels of action can be misleading, 
and even be used to deliberately conceal the essence of the action: ‘I have only...’37  
Teleologists agree that intentions are the criterion that distinguishes an action 
from a natural event.38 In contrast to the naturalistic translation thesis, they insist that 
mental language cannot be reduced to physical language, since intentions cannot be 
equated with the links of a causal chain.39  
Not only is it practically impossible to completely determine all the causal 
conditions for an action taking place, but this is also theoretically opposed by the 
conviction that a human being is fundamentally free in his decision to act.40  
 
 
31 Cf. Quitterer, ‘Basishandlungen’, pp. 107f. 
32 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, pp. 46-48; Quitterer, ‘Basishandlungen’, pp. 115f; Georg 
Kamp, ‘Basishandlungen’, in Handbuch Handlungstheorie. Grundlagen, Kontexte, Perspektiven, edited 
by Michael Kühler and Markus Rüther (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler Verlag, 2016), pp. 69-77, at pp. 69f. 
33 According to the ‘unifiers’/’minimizers’ bending the finger and killing the victim represent a 
single action; from the point of view of the ‘multipliers’/’maximizers’ these are numerically 
different actions (cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, pp. 50f; Quitterer, ‘Basishandlungen’, pp. 
116f; Christian Budnik, ‘Handlungsindividuation’, in Handbuch Handlungstheorie. Grundlagen, 
Kontexte, Perspektiven, edited by Michael Kühler and Markus Rüther (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler Verlag, 
2016), pp. 60-68, at p. 60). 
34 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, pp. 55, 59, 62; Quitterer, ‘Basishandlungen’, p. 106. 
35 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, pp. 65f. 
36 Cf. ibid., p. 62; Quitterer, ‘Basishandlungen’, pp. 118f. 
37 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, p. 62f. 
38 Cf. Friedo Ricken, Allgemeine Ethik (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2013 [1983])., pp. 103f; Horn, 
‘Einleitung’, p. 9; Sehon, ‘Abweichende Kausalketten’, p. 85; Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, 
pp. 12, 68; Donald Davidson, ‘Handlungen, Gründe und Ursachen’, in Gründe und Zwecke. Texte zur 
aktuellen Handlungstheorie, edited by  Christoph Horn and Guido Löhrer (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010), 
pp. 46-69, at p. 48. 
39 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, p. 76; Horn, ‘Einleitung’, p. 8; Sehon, ‘Abweichende 
Kausalketten’, p. 110. 
40 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, pp. 110-113.  







Donald Davidson, a representative of a moderate naturalism, takes this objection 
seriously and does not claim any principal predictability of human action. In the case of a 
broken windowpane, it can be stated afterwards, without any doubt, that a certain stone 
caused its breaking. However, to move from such a causal analysis to a prognosis about 
how hard one has to throw a stone against a window to break it in the future is 
something completely different.41 For actions, it applies analogously that individual, 
concrete actions can be explained causally and, in these individual cases, be translated 
into physical language. However, there are no laws either in the mental realm or between 
the mental and the physical sphere according to which predictions about future actions 
can be made. The name of this position, ‘anomalous monism,’ derives from the negation 
of such overarching laws.  
Teleologists reply that such a concept devalues the mental side, since it is 
causally effective only insofar as it can be translated into physical terms.42 Again, the 
intentionality of the actor is reduced.  
Instead of searching for mental or physical events within the actor that have 
produced his action, one should simply accept the actor himself as the origin of his action 
(‘agent-causality’).43 
 
The concept of ‘agency’ in Actor-Network Theory (ANT)  
Both naturalistic and teleological theories of action require a distinct separation between 
the subject and the object of an action. ANT criticizes this basic assumption. It opposes 
mechanistic, quasi-automatic explanations of actions, as well as models of understanding 
that presuppose the intention, autonomy, or consciousness of the human actor. But how 
are the terms ‘action’ and ‘agency’ to be understood if there is no subject-object 
difference, no primary principle, or no modern concept of the subject? 
ANT is a challenging alternative to traditional theories of action, and has become 
one of the classic approaches of technical sociology.44 Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and 
John Law founded this theory in the 1980s and continue to develop it further to this day. 
Despite the diversity and complexity of the concepts within this family of ANTs, some 
key aspects shall be briefly highlighted.45 
ANT does not ask why an actor acts in this way and not differently. Rather, it 
describes how an actor is transformed into an agent through the interplay of social, 
technical, and natural entities. The surprising thing is not so much that action always 
refers to others, but that non-humans are not simply passive objects of human action. 
Instead, they act themselves in a heterogeneous network.46  
 
 
41 Cf. Davidson, ‘Handlungen, Gründe und Ursachen’, pp. 63f. 
42 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, pp. 122-127, 132; Quitterer, ‘Basishandlungen’, pp. 109; 
112-114. 
43 Cf. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen?, pp. 144-147. 
44 Cf. Roger Häußling, Techniksoziologie. Eine Einführung (Opladen, Toronto: Verlag Barbara 
Budrich, 2019), pp. 240-252. 
45 A differentiated introduction to ANT in German is offered by Andréa Belliger and David J. 
Krieger, ‘Einführung in die Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie’, in ANThology. Ein einführendes Handbuch zur 
Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie, edited by Andréa Belliger and David J. Krieger (Bielefeld: transcript, 2006), 
pp. 13-50; Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer, Sozialtheorie der Technik (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 
2000). 
46 Cf. Bruno Latour, ‘Social Theory and the Study of Computerized Work Sites’, in Information 
Technology and Changes in Organizational Work, edited by W. J. Orlinokowsky and Geoff Walsham 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1996), pp. 295-307, at pp. 303ff. 







This basic assumption is formulated by ANT as the general principle of 
symmetry, which claims a radically equal treatment of humans and non-humans. Social, 
technical, and natural factors are equal and depend on each other.47 In order to clarify the 
concept that not only humans are capable of acting, ANT replaces the ‘actor’ with an 
‘actant.’ An actant is generally someone or something with the ability to act and to 
exercise activity.48  Both human and non-human actants begin to create heterogeneous 
networks by themselves. They do not precede their networking but are produced by the 
networking process. The results of such networking are hybrids (i.e. hybrid forms of the 
social, the technical, and the natural).49  
Actants transform into actors when a role and interests are assigned to them in 
the process of building networks (figuration).50 The successive and different steps of the 
network-building  process are summarized under the term ‘translation.’ This is ‘the 
continuous attempt to integrate actors into a network by 'translating' them into roles and 
interests.’51 Translations create the ‘identities, characteristics, competences, qualifications, 
behaviors, institutions, organizations and structures necessary to build a network of 
relatively stable, irreversible processes and procedures.’52 A ‘network’ is not an external 
social reality, but a theoretical term for a concept that ‘is traced by those translations in 
the scholars' accounts.’53 Statements about actants and actors are always moments in the 
process of network building or translation. 
Latour exemplified his ANT by closing a door.54 He understands this process as a 
network in which both human (= the user) and technical (= the door) actants are 
involved. If you regularly forget to close the door, this can quickly become a problem. 
This problem can then be solved, for instance, by introducing a sign, hiring a porter, or 
implementing a door-closing mechanism. If, for instance, a door-closing mechanism is 
installed, the new technical actant changes the characteristics and behavior of the existing 
network. For example, people have to adapt to the speed of the closing door.  
While humans determine technical behavior, technical artifacts can also lead to 
human behavioral changes. In ANT, there is no clearly assignable making and being 
made; instead, there is only the network of actants (e.g. texts, people, animals, 
architectures, machines, or money).55  
 
 
47 Cf. Bruno Latour, Wir sind nie modern gewesen. Versuch einer symmetrischen Anthropologie (Berlin: 
Akad.-Verl., 1995), pp. 125ff. 
48 Cf. Madeleine Akrich and Bruno Latour, ‘A Summary of a Convenient Vocabulary for the 
Semiotics of Human and Nonhuman Assemblies’, in Shaping Technology/ Building Society. Studies in 
Sociotechnical Change, edited by Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1992), pp. 259-264, at p. 259. 
49 Cf. Latour, Wir sind nie modern gewesen, pp. 7f. 
50 Cf. Michel Callon, ‘Einige Elemente einer Soziologie der Übersetzung: Die Domestikation der 
Kammmuscheln und der Fischer der S. Brieuc-Bucht’, in ANThology. Ein einführendes Handbuch zur 
Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie, edited by Andréa Belliger and David J. Krieger (Bielefeld: transcript, 2006), 
pp. 135-174, at pp. 146f; Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) p. 53. 
51 Belliger and Krieger‚ ‘Einführung in die Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie’, p. 39 (translated by authors). 
52 ibid., p. 39 (translated by authors). 
53 Latour, Reassembling the Social, p.108. 
54 Cf. Jim Johnson, ‘Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closer’, 
Social Problems 35:3 (1988), pp. 298-310. 
55 Cf. Michel Callon, ‘Techno-ökonomische Netzwerke und Irreversibilität’, in ANThology. Ein 
einführendes Handbuch zur Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie, edited by Andréa Belliger and David J. Krieger 
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2006), pp. 309-342, at p. 313. 







This sometimes results in controversial, even irritating formulations in Latour’s 
writing. Thus, a clumsy hotel key chain acts more morally than its human user. Due to its 
size, it forces the guest to hand in the key at the reception desk before leaving the hotel.56 
When asked whether a person or a weapon was responsible for killing a person, Latour 
replied: ‘It is neither people nor guns that kill. Responsibility for action must be shared 
among the various actants.’57 It is a hybrid that cannot be reduced to a technical or 
human actant. Agency emerges from a connection of actants in the network: ‘Action is a 
property of associated entities.’58 Action and agency are always distributed among 
different entities. According to the sociologist M. Wieser, the notion of the agency in 
terms of non-human things must ‘not be understood as animism or as the naive 
intentionality of things, but as the power of things, highlighting their resistance.’59 
‘Agency’ is not a substance, but a process.60 In this sense, non-humans also possess the 
ability to act, for which the English term ‘Agency’ or ‘Material Agency’ has prevailed in 
technical sociology.61  
 
 
Three technical-philosophical approaches  
 
It turned out that ‘agent’ or ‘agency’ are multifaceted concepts in the field of action 
theory. Their semantics and language practice depend on controversial and sometimes 
contradictory basic assumptions. The following technical-philosophical approaches are 
not identical with any of the action-theoretical directions discussed above. Nevertheless, 
the basic concerns, the course, or the focus of the following technical-philosophical 
approaches can each be traced back to one of the previously discussed theories of action. 
The following approaches aim to describe and ethically evaluate the complex 
human-computer interaction appropriately and descriptively with the help of the terms 
‘(moral) agent’ or ‘agency.’ 
The original problem and the basic concern of the three systemic models 
coincide. Nevertheless, Floridi's, Johnson's and Verbeek's answers compete with each 
other, and thus cannot be sensibly combined. To put it simply, we can describe Floridi's 
model as ‘techno-centric,’ Johnson's as ‘anthropocentric,’ and Verbeek's as 
‘constructivist.’ 
 
L. Floridi: Artificial Agency 
According to Floridi, the so-called standard ethics (i.e. deontological – like discourse-
theoretical and contractualistic – or teleological – like virtue-ethical or consequentialist 
 
 
56 Cf. Bruno Latour, ‘Technology is Society Made Durable’, in A Sociology of Monsters? Essays on 
Power, Technology and Domination, edited by John Law (London/ New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 
103-131. 
57 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope. Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1999), p. 180. 
58 Ibid., p. 182. 
59 Matthias Wieser, Das Netzwerk von Bruno Latour. Die Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie zwischen Science & 
Technology Studies und poststrukturalistischer Soziologie (Bielefeld: transcript, 2012), p. 182 (translated 
by authors). 
60 Cf. ibid., pp. 184f. 
61 Cf. Latour, Reassembling the Social, p. 45; Werner Rammert, Technik – Handeln – Wissen. Zu einer 
pragmatistischen Technik- und Sozialtheorie (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016 [2007]), p. 14; Wieser, Das 
Netzwerk von Bruno Latour, pp. 175-184. 







ethics) are hopelessly overwhelmed by the challenges of human-computer interaction.62 
The first reason for this is that in conventional philosophy, only human beings (and thus 
no AI), are considered ‘moral agents.’ Thus, the human actor is burdened by a 
disproportionally great responsibility.63 Secondly, actions are judged on the basis of the 
actor’s intentions:64 it is morally relevant whether a person is injured intentionally or 
unintentionally. However, this focus on intentions does not help us where AI is used. In 
fact, the impact of a self-learning computer system can never be overlooked completely 
and therefore cannot be answered for by the designer or user. It is for this reason that 
Floridi suggests that we broaden the concept of ‘moral agency’ and refrain from judging 
intentions.65  
Starting from the question who or what a ‘moral agent’ is, Floridi argues that 
definitions must be looked at in their particular context:66 A car mechanic looks at a car 
from a different point of view than an ethicist. To refer to these different points of view, 
Floridi uses the technical term ‘level of abstraction.’ At different levels of abstraction, 
different observables are relevant. For example, an ethicist delights in low pollutant 
emission, while a car mechanic is pleased by an unbroken V-belt.67 
In order to define ‘agent’ properly, Floridi suggests a higher level of abstraction 
than is usually adopted. Candidates for ‘agents’ should no longer be examined for 
intentionality or other mental abilities; instead, they should be observed from a more 
distant perspective, appearing only vaguely as ‘systems.’ To be called ‘agents,’ systems 
have to be interactive, autonomous, and adaptive.68 
According to Floridi, whether, for example, a computer program checking CVs is 
considered an ‘agent’ depends on the granularity of the level of abstraction employed: if 
only the incoming CVs and their outgoing evaluation are regarded as ‘observables,’ but 
the algorithm itself is hidden, the recruitment program appears interactive, autonomous, 
and adaptive, consequently, as an ‘agent’: ‘interactive,’ because it begins to work in 
reaction to an external input; ‘autonomous,’ because it arranges the many applications 
automatically – as in a black box –; and ‘adaptive,’ because it learns on the basis of the 
data records.69  
From ‘agent’ to ‘moral agent’ takes only a small step: for Floridi, all ‘agents’ 
whose actions have morally qualifiable consequences are ‘moral agents.’70 Consequently, 
the recruitment program is not only an ‘agent,’ but also a ‘moral agent,’ because its 
selection is sexually discriminatory.  
 
 
62 Cf. Luciano Floridi and Jeff W. Sanders, ‘Artificial Evil and the Foundation of Computer Ethics’, 
Ethics and Information Technology 3 (2001), pp. 55-66, at pp. 57, 64f. 
63 Cf. Luciano Floridi and Jeff W. Sanders, ‘On the Morality of Artificial Agents’, Minds and 
Machines 14 (2004), pp. 349-379, at pp. 350f. 
64 Cf. Luciano Floridi, ‘Faultless Responsibility: On the Nature and Allocation of Moral 
Responsibility for Distributed Moral Actions’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: 
Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 374 (2016), Issue 2083, at p. 4. 
65 Cf. ibid., p. 3f. 
66 Cf. Floridi and Sanders, ‘On the Morality of Artificial Agents’, pp. 352f. 
67 Cf. Luciano Floridi, ‘Levels of Abstraction and the Turing Test’, Kybernetes 39 (2010), pp. 423-440, 
at p. 426; Floridi and Sanders, ‘On the Morality of Artificial Agents’, p. 354. 
68 Cf. Floridi and Sanders, ‘On the Morality of Artificial Agents’, pp. 357f.; Floridi, ‘Levels of 
Abstraction’, p. 432. 
69 Cf. Floridi and Sanders, ‘On the Morality of Artificial Agents’, p. 362; Floridi, ‘Levels of 
Abstraction’, p. 432. 
70 Cf. Floridi and Sanders, ‘On the Morality of Artificial Agents’, p. 364. 







However, the program is not morally responsible for its consequences, as 
responsibility requires intention,71 but intention does not matter at the level of abstraction 
chosen for ‘agency.’ According to Floridi, ‘moral agents’ without intentions are not 
morally responsible for their actions but accountable.72 If artificial ‘moral agents’ cause 
damage – by analogy with sanctions on people – they can be modified, disconnected 
from the data network, or completely deleted or destroyed.73 
Floridi finally concludes that his understanding of ‘moral agency’ and 
‘accountability’ sufficiently clarifies the ethical questions of human-computer interaction: 
‘The great advantage is a better grasp of the moral discourse in non-human contexts.’74   
This positive self-evaluation of Floridi has to be questioned:  
First, the AI debate is – according to Floridi – about attributing responsibility. If we stick 
to this assumption, we cannot see how the existence of non-responsible ‘moral agents’ 
can help in the search for a culprit.  
Second, Floridi's reference to non-human ‘moral’ sources of good and evil of all 
kinds is nothing new in itself: a serious illness, a large avalanche, a chainsaw, a rabid dog, 
or falling roof tiles can all cause human suffering. However, despite the damage, we 
would never speak of a ‘moral’ avalanche, chainsaw, disease, dog, or tile. 
By calling computer systems ‘moral,’ we can neither describe their mode of 
action better (causality), nor come closer to resolving moral issues (evaluation of an 
action or attribution of responsibility).  
It can perhaps be said that the novelty of Floridi's approach lies not so much in 
qualifying the impacts of computer systems as ‘moral’ but in perceiving them as ‘agents’ 
at a certain level of abstraction. However, would that take us any further descriptively or 
normatively? This raises three thoughts: first, the necessity of making computer systems 
‘accountable’ (i.e. that they have to be reprogrammed or even switched off if deficient) 
may be realized without there being any need of calling them ‘moral agents.’ While we 
may call our computer names when it does not do what we want it to, we do not do so 
because we seriously believe it will somehow impress our computer. Second, not all links 
in a causal chain need to be called ‘moral agents’ in order to become the object of ethical 
thought. Even in the standard ethics scolded by Floridi, a moral evaluation of an action or 
the attribution of responsibility is only possible after a precise and sufficient description 
of the causal connections. Third, it must also be criticized that if something goes wrong, 
at the level of abstraction favored by Floridi, the question of responsibility can no longer 
be posed for AI as a ‘moral agent,’ since Floridi abstracts from human intention, and 
computer systems are accountable but not morally responsible. In this way, ethically 
questionable incentive structures emerge, where the responsible party can be excused 
prematurely. 
Thus, the impression is reinforced that the term ‘moral agents’ in Floridi's 
explanatory model contributes nothing toward gaining a better descriptive and 
normative understanding of human-computer interaction. It can thus be dismissed 
without consequences, since ‘moral agent’ or ‘moral agency’ is an empty concept if 




71 Cf. ibid., p. 365. 
72 Cf. ibid., pp.  351, 376. 
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D. G. Johnson: Triadic agency  
Deborah Johnson struggles to find a happy medium between two extremes: one position 
undermines human responsibility to the extent that computer systems are referred to as 
‘moral agents,’ and Johnson explicitly criticizes Floridi's approach. Representatives of the 
other position, on the other hand, misjudge the moral quality of machine behavior since 
they regard technology as extra-moral.  
In the course of a larger searching movement, Johnson developed the so-called 
‘Triadic agency’ model. According to Johnson, a state is caused neither by man nor by the 
computer system alone, but by a differentiated interaction. Basically, ‘agency’ means a 
‘capability to act.’ Johnson distinguishes between three forms of agency: 
(1) ‘causal agency’: things have a causal effect;75 
(2) ‘intentional agency’: people act intentionally; their intention causes the action;76  
(3) ‘triadic agency’: these forms of ‘agency’ relate to each other and are more than the 
sum of their individual parts. When people cooperate with computer systems, then:  
a. the user wants to achieve a certain goal – in our case the Amazon HR 
department wants an efficient and effective personnel selection –and delegates 
this task to the designers;  
b. the designer project team creates the recruitment program;  
c. with the help of this program the initial goal is achieved.77  
In the ‘triadic agency’ model, responsibility is attributed only to those who are able to act 
intentionally. Since AI has no intention, it bears no responsibility for its causal 
effectiveness. Only humans can be ‘moral agents’ due to their intentional capacity. People 
therefore remain responsible, even if they delegate increasingly complex tasks to AI. In 
the search for the responsible person(s), it has to be asked in the direction of the designer 
or user until a person (or a group of persons) is found. However, an answer to the 
question of how much responsibility each person bears cannot be found without also 
considering the technological component. 
By differentiating between three modes of action, Johnson first succeeds in 
maintaining the ontological difference between man and machine in terms of action 
theory. This differentiation is not essentialist, since it does not refer to fixed descriptive 
characteristics, but to certain abilities. Secondly, although only human beings can be 
responsible, their responsibility can only be clarified if all components of action are 
considered. Because of the descriptive and normative significance of machine behavior, 
Johnson does not want to renounce the agency attribution.  
However, Johnson's inclusive use of the term ‘agency’ gives rise to 
misunderstandings and side scenes, since one term refers to human beings, computer 
systems, and human-computer interaction. Johnson strives to name the difference and 
interrelationship between man and computer systems, but she shrinks from taking the 
final step and continues to call computer systems ‘agents.’ Unlike Floridi’s use of the 
term, Johnson’s ‘agency’ is not meaningless but misleading. It would have been more 
 
 
75 Cf. Markus Schlosser, ‘Agency’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015), online at 
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(accessed 2019-11-15), p. 4.  







beneficial to use different terms such as ‘factor,’ ‘cause,’ or ‘actor’ in order to emphasize 
the specific descriptive and normative contribution of computer systems. 
 
P.-P. Verbeek: Hybrid agency  
Peter-Paul Verbeek's ‘mediation theory’ is based on Don Ihde's postphenomenological 
approach and Bruno Latour's ‘actor-network theory.’78 Verbeek emphasizes the joint 
causality of man and technology. Hence, technology actively mediates between human 
beings and their environment.79 It does so on two levels: hermeneutically, by influencing 
human perception of the world, and pragmatically, in partaking in human action.80 
Returning to our example of a recruitment program, the question of how the 
human resources department perceives the applicants – as deficient or positive – is 
decisively mediated by technology (hermeneutical mediation), and the final recruitment 
decision is pragmatically mediated. It is neither determined by, nor can it be made 
completely independently of, technology.  
Consequently, according to Verbeek, moral decisions and actions are joint 
products of human beings and technology;81 morality is ‘hybrid,’ and ‘moral agency’ is a 
mixture (‘composite moral agency’).82 No thing or living being possesses ‘moral agency’ 
by itself. Rather, ‘moral agency’ results from complex technical-human interaction; it 
does not form the basis for an action but emerges from it.83 
Verbeek goes so far as to describe even the actors themselves as the result of 
interaction.84 Nevertheless, Verbeek's theorem of a hybrid ‘moral agency’ does not mean 
that people cannot bear responsibility. In particular, designers of computer systems bear 
great responsibility because technology shapes the way of being in the world, and thus 
the human being himself. Verbeek shows the ethical dimensions with sentences such as 
‘Designers materialize morality’85 and ‘Designing technology is designing human 
beings.’86  
Against this background, we would like to ask whether Verbeek's ‘moral agency’ 
attribution helps us to understand human-computer interaction better both descriptively 
and ethical-normatively. The strength of Verbeek's postphenomenological-constructivist 
mediation theory undoubtedly lies in the fact that it acknowledges the complexity of 
human-computer interaction. Verbeek's approach is particularly successful in reflecting 
 
 
78 Cf. Peter-Paul Verbeek. ‘Materializing Morality. Design Ethics and Technological Mediation’, 
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84 Cf. Peter-Paul Verbeek, ‘Beyond Interaction: A Short Introduction to Mediation Theory’, 
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reality. If we accept that technology creates reality in terms of its interplay with human 
beings, and if this awareness replaces both obsession with, as well as forgetfulness about, 
technology, then much is gained for the debate about the responsible use of technology in 
both a descriptive and normative sense. This is true even if mediation is not a specific 
characteristic of technology alone.  
However, with regard to Verbeek's understanding of ‘moral agency,’ there are 
important inquiries to make: 
Unlike Floridi, Verbeek considers intentionality and freedom as part of the term 
‘moral agency,’ albeit in a mediated, hybrid form. However, intentionality and freedom 
do not constitute ‘moral agency’. Instead, and much like ‘moral agency’ itself, this only 
results from a complex human-computer interaction.  
The strength of the postphenomenological-constructivist view of reality turns 
into a weakness as soon as we want to attribute agency or responsibility to individual, 
concrete entities. In Verbeek's mediation theory, ‘moral agency,’ intention, freedom, and 
thus responsibility can no longer be attributed to individuals, since they always emerge 
from an overall structure. Ultimately, in Verbeek's theory of mediation, the individual 
and his actions cannot be conceived without technical influences or mediation. Human 
beings and computer systems are ‘actants’ – only as a mixture are they also ‘agents.’ 
Verbeek's two concerns – reconstructing the understanding of human-computer 
interaction and attributing moral responsibility – could also be fulfilled if the human 
actors remained ‘moral agents.’ For the realization that human capacity to act is always 
mediated is nothing new from a philosophical point of view. However, in order to avoid 
a circular conclusion in the attribution of ‘moral agency’ and moral responsibility, the 
freedom of human actors must be regarded as taking precedence. This is because 
interaction does not have its origin in itself but is a consequence of the human ability to 





This study has revealed the opportunities and risks of applying the concept of ‘moral 
agency’ to human-computer interaction. Ultimately, the risks of agency attribution to 
computational behavior are disproportionate to the benefits of such language practice. 
From a descriptive and ethical-normative point of view, this practice proves to be 
both unnecessary and risky. Floridi's use of ‘moral agents’ for computer systems is 
redundant. Exclusive features for human or social contexts (e.g. ‘intentionality’ or 
‘responsibility’), which should be preserved, come out of sight. 
Verbeek offers a comprehensive and promising understanding of human-
computer interaction. However, his ‘moral agent’ attribution is circular or leads to an 
infinite regression, thus making it objectionable. This is illustrated by the fact that it is 
difficult to identify a specific human capacity or actor for responsibility. 
Johnson's results are consistent in view of their ontological and action-theoretical 
premises. She also conceptually differentiates the contribution of each component and is 
thus able to provide an almost accurate understanding of human-computer interaction. 
However, the ‘agency’ attribution gives rise to misunderstandings. At the same time, 
there is a serious risk that the extensive use of ‘moral agents’ undermines the question of 
responsibility.  







Consequently, an appropriate differentiation between humans and computers 
should also be conceptually discernible. In this way, human-computer interaction can not 
only be described more precisely but the ethical-normative structure can also be 
elaborated more clearly. 
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